Expanding the Conversation: Dahlia Scheindlin

By :  Expanding the Conversation Podcast | Israel

How far can a democracy bend?

In this episode of Expanding the Conversation, political strategist and public opinion expert Dr. Dalia Scheindlin explores the urgent challenges facing Israel today. Recorded live at The Jewish Theological Seminary’s Israel at a Crossroads convening, this talk examines three major dilemmas: the war in Gaza and the West Bank, the future of Israeli politics under Prime Minister Netanyahu, and the country’s democratic resiliency. Scheindlin discusses possible outcomes—from political stagnation to regional diplomacy, political change, and constitutional reform.

This episode offers essential insight into Israeli democracy, public opinion, and the role of civil society, while also addressing how American Jews can meaningfully engage with Israel’s current reality.

Bio of Dahlia Scheindlin

EMBEDDED LINK

Discussion Questions

1. Crossroads of War and Occupation
Dr. Scheindlin outlines two divergent paths regarding Israel’s military presence in Gaza and the West Bank. What do you think are the long-term implications of each path for Israel, Palestinians, and regional stability?

2. Crossroads of Politics
She speaks of the possibility of elections becoming less meaningful due to erosion of democratic norms. What indicators do you think signal a democracy in decline? Are those indicators present in Israel today?

3. Crossroads of Democracy and Constitution
Dr. Scheindlin argues that Israel needs a formal constitution to define equality, the source of legal authority, and citizenship. How might the absence of a formal constitution affect public trust and civil rights in Israel?

4. The Role of Civil Society
In her talk, civil society mobilization is described as a primary source of hope. What lessons can be drawn from the way Israeli civil society has responded to government actions since 2023?

5. Diaspora Engagement
Dr. Scheindlin emphasizes that American Jews must “learn the situation for real” and bring their democratic values to conversations with Israelis. How can American Jews engage responsibly and effectively with Israel’s internal struggles? What tensions exist between solidarity and critique when it comes to Diaspora-Israel relations?

6. Personal Reflection
Which of the crossroads Dahlia Scheindlin identifies—war, politics, or democracy—feels most urgent to you? Why? What gives you hope for Israel’s future? What are you most concerned about?

Show Notes

Transcript

Ellie Gettinger

Welcome to Expanding the Conversation, a podcast series that brings the Jewish Theological Seminary to you. This series focuses on the messages that emerged from Israel at a crossroads. Navigating religion, democracy and justice. A convening that took place at Gates in April of 2025. I’m Elie Gettinger, director of outreach for the Center for Lifelong Learning, and I’ll be curating the series, which will highlight key messages from the convening itself with insight from our panelists that was recorded separately.

In this episode, we hear from Dr. Dalia Scheindlin, a political strategist and public opinion expert in Israel. She wrote the book The Crooked Timber of Democracy in Israel, which was published in September 2023. She was asked to sum up two days of intensive discussions and provide insight into where Israel is going, an incredibly high bar when you consider the breadth of discussion throughout this convening. From culture to trauma to pluralism, memory rights, democracy, just to name a few of the themes that emerged. In her talk, she introduced three potential crossroads and which directions the Israeli government and its people could choose to take.

Dahlia Scheindlin

I was charged with kind of trying to figure out how to sum up both a bit of the conference, but particularly sum up the situation of Israel right now.

And we decided to focus on what I see as the three most important areas of life in Israel right now, which I see as a matter of three dilemmas or three sets of crossroads. And, you know, we can all pretty much at any time, anywhere, you can say, you know, we’re at a crossroads. But I think that it is more realistic now than ever.

It’s really exactly where we are. The paths that we’re on are fundamentally different from things that came before and in those three areas are the situation of the war, the situation of Israeli politics, which is always fun for people. But it is actually our real life. It’s not just fun and the situation of democracy and all of those things.

I’m going to try to outline the pathways. Okay. Looking at where this country and society seems to be going at present, as I see it in my analysis. And what is the alternative? And that I see as the crossroads that we face on each of these areas. On the issue of the war, So where do we stand now?

The path that we’re on at present is the path that is being led by the current government. As you all know, the war restarted in full as of I believe it was the 18th of March. Then the prime minister and the defense minister are speaking very consistently in recent days about about taking territory in Gaza, and they say they use the term in Hebrew lakahat.

They’re just saying we’re going to take territory. And the defense minister actually used the term nitzaref. We will join that territory. It depends on which day in which statement you look at. But they are talking about this increasingly openly. And so if there is not a cease fire, an end to the war, that seems to be where the government will be taking the current campaign in Gaza.

And ironically, even as I was, I wrote my notes and I left from 111th Street to walk over here this afternoon. And by the time I got here, there was another communique from the prime minister saying we are taking a whole new swath of a kind of corridor in Gaza right now. So this is not theoretical. This is the pace of these kinds of statements coming from the prime minister and his ministers has been accelerating.

We see also very, very open statements about encouraging Palestinian emigration or expulsion from Gaza. Usually the language is emigration, voluntary emigration. But of course, under conditions of the war that make life essentially impossible in Gaza, especially if there is no reconstruction. And so it’s very hard to see that as anything other than a forced emigration. All of that will lead to a situation where if Israel takes control and establishes policies that that advance emigration or expulsion on some level, what we have heard other government ministers talking about actually for about a year, at least a year now, I think I first noticed it in January 2024 is the possibility of establishing a military government

in Gaza. Our finance minister has been discussing this again from the beginning practically, and I think it will be inevitable if the war doesn’t end. And of course there are other ministers in the government backed by certain communities who have been advocating from the start to reestablish settlements in Gaza. Anecdotally, every few weeks nowadays we hear about people trying to infiltrate like Israeli Jews trying to sneak into Gaza.

It seems strange. Why would a civilian just try to sneak into Gaza when it’s, you know, a destroyed war zone? Well, because they want to kind of establish a little foothold. I should also point out that in the West Bank, there has been a very significant military operation going on since, by my count, about an 18th roughly of January, shortly after the ceasefire went into effect, which is the second such very extensive military operation in the heavily populated cities, an area A that has been nominally under Palestinian Authority control for to some extent over the years.

But these extensive military operations are very widespread. They have not ended at this point there. The military operation in Jenin, the Jenin area, Tulkarm area are ongoing, in addition to expanding settlements in general throughout the West Bank. And so what we see is something like and this government, by the way, has let me go back to the early statements of this government when it was established before the war.

The government was established in late 2022, and its founding document outlining its principles says essentially declares an intention to establish Jewish control over all of the areas of the land of Israel, including Judea and Samaria. That’s written in the government’s own agreement. So that is the path of this government, the country. Having said that, also, we should remember that Hamas still exists.

Hamas has not been replaced or destroyed. It has been severely weakened. It has been severely incapacitated partly, but it has also been recruiting more. And I think just a few hours ago, there were also rockets fired from parts of Gaza. So what we see is essentially if this path continues, there will be extensive control over Gaza, possibly some form of annexation, including them alongside the de facto annexation within the West Bank.

And we will see an ongoing insurgency by the remnants of Hamas, which will constantly try to rebuild itself. That’s the current path. There is an alternate path, and this is the crossroads we’re talking about with relation to the war and in that alternate path. We’ve seen this play out in its initial stages. There will be some sort of a cease fire.

We saw the first stage of the cease fire. That was in another scenario, the negotiations that are sometimes happening, sometimes not. I mean, there mediate. It’s a mediated process, right? There’s not direct negotiations, but they reach some sort of the next stage of the deal, which involves eventually the release of all of the Israeli hostages being held by Hamas in Gaza and in return, ultimately a permanent cease fire and withdrawal of most forces, at least from Gaza.

I think that if we’re really looking at alternative path with relation to the war and the conflict with the Palestinians and occupation, that early stage of ending this phase of the war, a second stage which involves hostage release and a cease fire, a permanent cease fire, would then lead to a bigger process, a longer term process, which would have to have the complete commitment and participation of Israel’s allies, the United States.

Who knows if this government is committed to that or not. It’s hard to know what this president wants with relation to Israel, but let’s say there is a longer term process that involves involvement, commitment of the U.S., of Arab states who are allies of Israel, the possibility of normalizing with other Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, and of course, the European community, who is always committed to advancing some sort of political framework.

And I think that we should assume this will involve regional normalization deals and regional participation with Israel and other Arab partners that supports a diplomatic resolution of the conflict with the Palestinians in a way that ends occupation and leads to Palestinian self-determination in some form. When I say in some form, we don’t know. Certainly it’s not going to be something immediate.

It will be a process. But the question is whether it’s a real process or what. Some of the language now talks about an irreversible process, and that will probably happen in the form of a Palestinian state, what we call a two-state solution in some form. Personally, I think the old version of a complete international division and a hard partition cannot happen anymore.

I don’t see how it would be implemented. I do think it will be two states in a partnership based association, something like a confederation along the lines of the European Union, but again, backed by, I think, a number of outside actors who will either support and lead this process or maybe even try to pressure the sides to get to this process, because I don’t think hard partition can really happen.

I think you will have two states that end up, you know, cooperating and having an association where they deal with the core issues together economy, security policy, natural resources, public health, residency and citizenship. But ultimately you have this alternative pathway, the step to resolving the immediate conflict leading to a longer term process for comprehensive resolution, which will never happen under the current government.

And that brings me to the second major crossroads, which is Israeli politics, because the current government will not take the second path. The current government is well on the way towards the first path. So what is the chance for a change of government? Let’s go through the two scenarios. One path in that crossroads is that Netanyahu will stay in power. After October seventh, there was a lot of talk about Israeli kind of analysts and even people who said he’ll never survive this after this disaster. And here we are. So he manages to stay around. Now, how could those things happen? One, the original coalition that won the elections in November 2022 had four parties. Now they’re actually five parties because two of them broke up.

But those parties could still win an election just as they are. They could. It’s unlikely based on current polling and not just current polling, but polling ever since January 2023. So within about a month after the government was elected, this particular coalition had lost its majority in surveys. But they’ve been very consistent and by contrast to pretty much every other country, when a war breaks out, the first thing you see is the rallying effect, right?

Support for the government goes way up. In Israel, we had the opposite effect. Support for the government collapsed. The current government, the parties of the coalition, held 64 seats out of 120 in the Knesset. All polling showed them in the mid 40 seat range, so they had lost about a third of their votes as a coalition. Netanyahu’s personal ratings in all surveys collapsed to the lowest I’ve seen him, I think, really at any time in the last 20, sorry, let’s say 15 years, he fell 20 points behind all other competitors on a personal level and trust in the government in a generic sense went down to below 20%.

The Likud itself lost about half of its support in surveys, and that situation was very stable for about the first six months since about April 2024. Polls consistently show the government has it has recovered to where it was before the war, not to where it was in the November 2022 elections. So those parties of the coalition are now polling at around 52, 54, 55 seats out of 120.

They still don’t have 61. But that’s not that. That’s not so far by the time of the next elections, which will probably be held in late 2026, the government, having passed a budget, stabilized itself, brought in more parties to the coalition, now is a bit bigger. So by that time they could still simply win an election along the lines of the original parties of the coalition.

And that’s one way Netanyahu stays in power. Another way is that the original parties of the coalition Likud, Shas, Torah Judaism and the combination of Religious Zionism and the Jewish Power Party, maybe they can’t win in a majority. Maybe they only get 50 to 53 seats like they’re getting in surveys now. But as we say in Hebrew Elohim Gadol, there are lots of parties.

In Israel, we often have 35 to 40 parties running in elections. We often have between eight and 13 that enter Knesset. And Netanyahu is the most seasoned politician in Israel, and he knows better than anybody how to orchestrate the political system. Who knows? He might find new coalition partners and manage to get a majority after the elections. And the last option, which I think is a long shot, there could be a way to postpone elections and simply not hold them, at least as scheduled.

I think it’s difficult because we have a basic law, and it’s one of the few articles in the basic laws of Israel, and this article about the date of elections is entrenched by a two thirds majority in the Knesset. You need 80 members of the Knesset to change the article that specifies that elections should be held after four years.

But there are ways to change it, and it’s not impossible that the government would try those interpretations. Or simply put, so much pressure on the kinds of civil liberties that you need to have meaningful elections, that the elections are no longer as meaningful because the opposition has been stifled and people’s ability to run or parties are more easily rejected in the political system.

And this is what we’ve seen in some of the other countries facing democratic decline, not something as crude as canceling elections altogether, but simply making them less meaningful by having less space within civil society to form opposition, to express opinions, less free media, etc.. That’s one path for Israeli politics or the other path. Okay, I don’t like predicting ever, but I think I feel pretty comfortable predicting that there’s not going to be a left-wing victory in Israel anytime soon.

However, most likely the parties that are doing very well in all surveys throughout this time are right wing parties in terms of their security approach. They are right wing in terms of oftentimes they have a strong militaristic approach. They are nationalist, but they are not religious parties per se. Certainly they’re not messianic or fundamentalist theocratic parties like. And those are the parties that are doing very well.

Party the party run by Benny Gantz, the party of Avigdor Lieberman. Right. Yisrael Beiteinu is also doing very well in survey research. And so those are the parties that could possibly win a majority of the parliamentary seats, in addition to parties of the center parties of the left. What’s interesting, actually is the party representing the Israeli left right now is polling at around 13 or 14 seats.

The leader of that party Yair Golan, merged two smaller left-wing parties and in the last in the current Knesset, those parties only held four seats and now they’re polling at 13-14, which is an interesting dynamic in itself. But all of those parties together could possibly win a coalition majority, especially if they put another Arab party into the coalition.

Israel did it once in terms of independent Arab parties. It wasn’t that long ago. It was deeply controversial and it led to some backlash. But I think from a Democratic perspective, what could be more Democratic than having parties represented in the governing coalition who represent Israel’s biggest national minority?

Ellie Gettinger

Let’s go to my conversation with Dalia Scheindlin where we spoke about these on the ground political realities.

Dalia Scheindlin

What does support for Israel mean to you? What it really means is knowing Israel and knowing Israel means knowing its communities. The the distinctions between the different communities, respecting the different experiences of those different communities. And I think I would avoid any assumption that one voice or one community represents everybody. It’s not like that anywhere in the world.

So when people say, well, my Israeli friends tell me, check your Israeli friends, I mean, even Israelis shouldn’t be saying that. Of course, you know, until they understand something about the dynamic of public opinion. I am a public opinion researcher, so I’m very attuned to the very, very deep divisions within Israeli society. And they are so deep, they are fairly unified over certain themes in Israeli life right now.

For example, there is a very significant consensus, actually, I shouldn’t say consensus. There’s a significant majority of about 60 to 70%. And it can sometimes be over 70% or just under 60% who are pretty much want a deal to bring back the hostages who are being held by Hamas in Gaza under any terms. That’s not a consensus, right?

A consensus would be something like over 80%. I would call it a consensus, quite a consensus that there are very significant majorities on certain key issues like that. But in terms of the vision for the country, in terms of, you know, the path forward, there are very, very deep divisions. And you can say there’s a majority who, for example, would prefer to preserve Israel’s judicial institutions and democracy, because there is in every survey, the test these things, it’s not big enough to call it a consensus.

And that’s why the country is so deeply divided. There is a large minority who support what the government is doing. And so therefore, you had these kind of pitched political battles that have brought the country to the brink of disaster. And if people fail to realize that they are not truly loving the country, they think that they are loving.

Ellie Gettinger

Let’s return to her talk at the convening where she provided insight to the current government’s policy on expansion.

Dahlia Scheindlin

If they want to take an alternative path to ultimately decide that Israel is not committed to territorial expansionism right now, by the way, Israel is not only de facto in many ways annexing the West Bank and laying the groundwork for annexation in Gaza.

But Israel also has a military presence right now in Syria and in Lebanon. The government has stated that it does not plan to evacuate those positions any time soon. So it looks very much like there’s an expansionist kind of vision and a different path with a different Israeli political leadership could decide that that is not Israel’s goal and it is not Israel’s interest, and that Israel would prefer to keep its global membership among democratic allies, leverage those allies, or be pressured by them because they’re not going to be as sophisticated as Netanyahu in avoiding pressure from allies if there is such pressure.

And they might decide that Israel actually needs to make a decision with relation to the Palestinians, which is something it’s never really wanted to do, or at least not totally name, other than the attempts to negotiate which have not come to fruition in past years. Both sides bear some responsibility for that. You know, this ending point for the second scenario of politics leads us to what I think is the deepest dilemma at all, and that’s Israel’s constitutional crisis.

Okay? It is at a crossroads. We’ve been in a permanent constitutional crisis that evolves and adds new elements or new dimensions pretty much every few months. It never stopped. If you hear people say, well, the war ended, the judicial assault, it didn’t. It just changed form. I’m happy to talk about how, but that’s the one path that the government has basically put before our eyes.

In January 2023 by announcing the judicial reforms. The other path is what I call reconstitution of Israel. And what I mean by that is, a, that Israel needs a constitution, a formal constitution, not because I think constitutions can solve every problem. We’re talking the United States of America right now. And you have a great constitution and you have a lot of problems.

But I do think that the Constitution, in a bigger sense, like with a small C, a constitutional way of thinking, forces Israel to make decisions that it has not wanted to make since its establishment. One of the first biggest decisions that Israel has never really made is where does the source of authority come from? From above? Or is it from the people?

In a democracy, the source of authority is supposed to be come from the people. That doesn’t mean you can’t be religious. It doesn’t mean you can’t have a character of the state that is defined by the Jewish identity on some level. But what is the source of the authority of the state? There has never been a consensus about it, and as a result, you have specific communities who never felt themselves bound by the institution of the law.

The question of equality has been excluded from Israel’s primary legislation when it comes to the basic equality of all citizens. It does not appear in our basic laws. The basic law of human dignity and liberty was only passed in 1992. Okay, up until then, we had no formal primary legislation for basic human rights, and even then it doesn’t explicitly say equality.

It didn’t say it, and then it was amended two years later to include a reference to the Declaration of Independence. And as the Supreme Court noticed in its hearing, it was argued in the Supreme Court, in the hearing just over the reasonability clause back in July 2024, inclusion of independence is hotly disputed. All of this is by implication.

So I think the question of equality has been left out of Israeli law. Of course not by accident, but because of these political dilemmas that began, you know, from the moment of independence and now never actually making a decision on this or depending on the courts, for example, depending on Supreme Court interpretation, A) leaves everything open to interpretation. B) puts the Supreme Court in the position of being attacked and politicized, and C) makes citizens wonder if it’s truly an ethos of Israeli society. So a constitution forces you to at least make a decision about that. A constitution doesn’t force you, but should prompt a discussion and a decision about where Israel’s borders are. What are Israel’s borders? We have some peace agreements, but even a peace agreement with Jordan, if you actually try to figure out what is the border between Israel and Jordan and is it a hard international border, who owns that border?

Is it sovereign territory? It’s the West Bank. So where are Israel’s borders? And once you have defined borders, you also define who’s a citizen. And people inside those borders should have equal rights that I just talked about. And people who are not within Israel’s borders should not be controlled by Israel. The pretty basic distinction that we understand for all other states.

And finally, the question of a Jewish state. You know, the old equation of either have to be Jewish or democratic, or you are Jewish and democratic. The idea that defining Israel as a Jewish state must come at the expense of democracy and equality. I don’t see that. And I think that we see in other societies that our nation states with a national identity that can name a national identity alongside the commitment to the basic principles of democracy, equality of all citizens, basic human rights, and numerous examples of constitutions from around the world that also name the rights of collective rights of minorities in their country, even if they define themselves with a national identity.

It involves reducing the Jewish the Jewish state part of it to character, culture, things that are inclusive, that don’t exclude necessarily other cultures within your community, rather than a definition of a Jewish state that is institutional, institutionalized and exclusive. So those are the dilemmas that if Israel is ready to make them, it can reach a constitution. And then I think it will have the foundations on which to build a sustainable democracy.

Ellie Gettinger

Where are you finding hope right now?

Dahlia Scheindlin

The possibility of collaboration and coalition building in Israel in particular. And I can look at other places too, but it has come through an extraordinarily extraordinary mobilization of civil society. And civil society can be this kind of abstract term. But what I mean is people, regular people, people who are not elected officials, people who are not political figures, people who are not even necessarily party members, certainly not party activists or leaders, and many people who never were even that engaged before in public activity.

But we’re talking at the level of hundreds of thousands of Israelis who have taken to the streets since January 2023 in the name of, first of all, protesting the government’s policies to try to undermine judicial independence. But basically, even if they’re not constitutional, law scholars realizing that the identity of the country is at stake, and certainly any potential for building a genuine democracy in Israel is being crushed by those policies.

And so they were simply not going to let it happen. And so what you see is, you know, hundreds of thousands of people who went out not once, not twice, but almost every day, and then, of course, massive demonstrations every week throughout 2023, which was already extraordinary. And new organizations were formed, a new coalitions. And, you know, a lot of reaching across other sorts of smaller divisions.

So that people could simply agree on the immediate priority, which was to stop that plan. And they managed to slow it down. It’s been very it was very tough struggle all year. But then the war broke out. What you saw at that time was, you know, similarly an incredible, you know, incredibly elaborate mobilization of the same forces and additional forces even across further political aisles to support the Israeli society where the state was fundamentally absent after October seven, certainly for the first months in dealing with the displaced people and dealing with reservists and dealing with hostage families and took months for the state to actually be there, they were able you know, people were able to build on the structures that had been developed that they had developed during 2023 to cope with that. And we’re seeing all of those same forces combining now to try to protest the government’s avoidance of any sort of a cease fire that would bring about the release of the remaining hostages and to protest its continued assault on the institutions of democracy in Israel.

I just want to point out that it’s really no longer just about the threat to the judiciary. This is an all systems assault on all gatekeepers in Israeli society. There’s just it’s in every single possible field, including the ones that make big headlines like the government trying to fire the attorney general, the head of the Shin Bet security services, or at very micro levels that not as many people think about, like trying to replace lower level figures of professional levels of government with loyalists and all the while expanding Israel’s annexation of the West Bank in practice and openly, you know, grabbing territory in Gaza and saying so and so.

All of these are going to combine to lead to a very dark direction. An Israeli society, I wouldn’t say is going out to protest necessarily for peace and love, because it’s a very hard time right now. But they are certainly realizing that the assault on Democratic institutions and the assault on what they see as Israeli democracy, I think we have to be much more cautious about that term, you know, really at the brink right now.

And so that has that movement has combined under the umbrella of getting the hostages back, which they see, as you know, in some sense fundamentally related. Netanyahu doesn’t want to give up, get the hostages back, not that he doesn’t want them back, but he won’t make the necessary compromises in terms of a ceasefire to get them back because he would lose his government and he would lose power without that government and that government wants to undermine, if not outright destroy, democratic checks and balances and ultimately the democratic character of society.

So all of that, you know, incredible energy in the street is the main source of hope. What’s worrying is that seems to be the only source of hope. There does not seem to be any real leverage from within the political system to oppose the current government. People are trying, regular people are trying.

Ellie Gettinger

At the end of the session, Dalia was asked about the role American Jews can play within Israeli society.

Dahlia Scheindlin

People often ask me, What can American Jews do? And I say, First of all, learn the situation for real. You know, not to accuse anybody of not knowing the situation, but if you really understand this stuff, I would imagine that you’ll see a lot of commonalities and understand that there are things that American Jews would, you know, would find completely anathema to their way of thinking about politics.

I think American Jews are in a different position from Israeli Jews. Having lived as a minority in America. The major waves of immigration, the late 19th and early 20th century Americans are aware of how well liberal democracy has served Jews and how well it has served them, especially in solidarity with other minorities. And that’s why American Jews have been so prominent, I think in the civil, civil rights and civil liberties communities and preserving democracy in America, especially those that involve solidarity with other communities.

So I’d like for that to be a sensibility and an understanding that American Jews bring to Israel, I mean, physically bring to Israel, come to Israel and tell Israelis that.

Ellie Gettinger

Thank you for listening. Throughout the series, we will be introducing audio from the meeting. Israel at a Crossroads. Each episode will highlight another speaker from this program, Dahlia Sheindlin laid the groundwork for the myriad of issues that divide Israeli society. While no one has easy solutions to these problems, the panelists throughout the convening did a wonderful job of finding points of possible interactions and engagement. I hope you will expand this conversation, sharing your concerns and questions, and maybe this podcast with friends and family members. If you want to see complete footage of this session or of any of the sessions of the meeting, Israel at a Crossroads.

You can find a link on our website jtsa.edu/podcasts. Look for the “Expanding the Conversation” icon. Each episode includes discussion questions for individuals or groups to consider and links to our speakers, organizations and publications. If you would like to attend a Convening, you can find information about our upcoming programs at jtsa.edu/convenings

I’m Ellie Gettinger, director of Outreach for JTS. This podcast was produced by me with technical support from Chris Hickey, director of New Media. This is a production of the Jewish Theological Seminary. No part of this podcast may be reproduced or transmitted in any form without the written permission of the Jewish Theological Seminary. The views expressed here in may not be those of the Jewish Theological Seminary.

More by More on